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Abstract Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its
rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying
what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are
both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I
argue that (a) inferentialism can be defended against McGrath’s objections; (b) if
her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that
she neglects, intuitionism; and (c), reductive epistemologists can appeal to non-
naturalist commitments to avoid McGrath’s counterexamples.
Keywords Moral epistemology  Moral perception  Inferentialism  Intuition 
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1 Introduction
Sarah McGrath’s ‘Moral Perception and Its Rivals’ argues for the modest but
controversial claim that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.1 An important
and welcome feature of McGrath’s approach is that it explores a familiar issue in
moral epistemology via considering simple, mundane cases. Her central example
involves no esoteric moral propositions or improbable stipulations about extraor-
dinary circumstances. It involves ordinary agents witnessing ordinary instances of
moral wrongdoing: ‘While walking through a grocery store parking lot, you witness
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a frustrated adult lash out and strike a child across the face, causing the child to
draw back in pain and surprise’ (1). Let’s assume, following McGrath, that you
know that the adult acted wrongly. The central question is: how do you know this?
And McGrath’s thesis is that your knowledge that the adult acted wrongly is
perceptual knowledge.
Another important feature of McGrath’s approach is that she defends her thesis
by eliminating rival hypotheses about how we have moral knowledge in such
ordinary cases. This flips the typical dialectic (2). Instead of playing defense against
critics of moral perception, McGrath goes on the offensive, arguing that alternative
views are implausible.
I am sympathetic to the view that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.
But I contend that rival hypotheses can plausibly explain how we have moral
knowledge in ordinary cases. To show why, I will take on three main tasks in this
paper. The first will be to defend inferentialism against McGrath’s objections: her
arguments against toy versions of inferentialism overgeneralize, and leave
sophisticated versions of the view unscathed. The second will be to argue that if
her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should simply accept intuitionism:
this rival hypothesis, which McGrath ignores, has a much easier time explaining
moral knowledge about unperceived thought experiments. The third will be to argue
that reductive epistemologists can draw on recent work on metaethical non-
naturalism to avoid McGrath’s counterexamples.
2 The perceptualist
Before we consider rival hypotheses, let’s start by outlining the perceptualist
explanation of ordinary moral knowledge. In particular, let’s ask: Must perceptu-
alists about morality take on implausible commitments about the nature and
epistemological import of perception generally?
According to McGrath, the answer is clearly no. To show why, she offers what
she calls a ‘relaxed’ account of perceptualist moral knowledge (21 ff.), which allows
the perceptualist to say that we can have perceptual knowledge that the adult’s act is
wrong without necessarily having a perceptual experience with the content ‘the
adult’s act is wrong’ (24).
To appreciate the significance of this, consider austere views about the contents
of perceptual experience, according to which we see colors and shapes and not
much else. If we adopt such a view, our visual experience of the parking lot scene
will not represent moral wrongness; but nor will our visual experience represent
various non-moral objects, properties and relations: the adult, the child, the
frustration, the causation, or the pain. Proponents of austere views can and should
still accept that we can know, via perception, that the frustrated adult struck the
child, causing pain. Likewise, they can accept that we know that the adult’s act was
wrong via perception, even though ‘wrongness’ was not represented in perception.
Instead, as McGrath writes, it might be that ‘the features of the scene that you do
take in in your visual experience trigger or prompt you to take up the immediate,
non-inferential belief’ that the adult’s act was wrong (24).
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As McGrath notes, this way of defending moral perception is not novel.2 And in
fact, the same point has been made in Margot Strohminger’s recent defense of the
highly counter-orthodox view that we can have perceptual knowledge of
metaphysical possibilities.3 I will assume that one’s views about moral and
metaphysical perception should be closely aligned. (The contrary assumption seems
implausible: why think that the commitments and merits of perceptualism will differ
so wildly between these domains?) Prima facie, this should be welcome: if
metaphysical perception is defensible, and defensible on similar terms, this is good
news for moral perception. Though it shall also place some constraints on
McGrath’s options in response to one problem we will encounter in Sect. 4.
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. One curious feature of McGrath and
Strohminger’s views is that while they argue that perceptualists need not take on
contentious commitments about the contents of perceptions, both also take on a
strong commitment about the nature of perception: namely, both commit to the view
that perception is non-inferential.4 As we saw above, on McGrath’s view ‘your
visual experience trigger[s] or prompt[s] you to take up the immediate, non-
inferential belief’. This is a common albeit contentious view: many, such as Jerry
Fodor, reject it.5 Shouldn’t we prefer a form of moral perceptualism that is more
ecumenical?
It may seem that this commitment is unavoidable for perceptualists, so they must
inevitably take up arms against views like Fodor’s. After all, if perception is
inferential, whither the disagreement with inferentialism?
However, the perceptualist need not adopt this commitment. To see why,
consider what we should say about the epistemology of perception if we adopt the
view that perception is an inferential process. Perhaps your perceptual belief that the
adult intentionally struck the child rests on sub-conscious inferences from complex
conditional propositions. This is a claim about the etiology of perception. From this
claim about its etiology, nothing follows whatsoever about the epistemology of
perception.
An inferentialist epistemology of perception is one on which justification or
knowledge is transmitted from premises to the concluding perceptual belief.6 This
view is not forced on us if we believe that perception is inferential. You may think
that even if your perceptual belief that the adult intentionally struck the child was
2 See McGrath (2018, footnote 16), and references therein.
3 Strohminger (2015, especially at p. 321) (‘I am not claiming that sensory experiences themselves ever
have modal contents.… Arguably, perceptual knowledge is possible even when the content known is not
represented in sensory experience’).
4 Ibid., p. 365: citing Miller (perceptual knowledge ‘arises immediately from current perception, that is,
without inference from prior assumptions’).
5 See, e.g., Fodor (1983), and for very helpful discussion see Firestone and Scholl (2016). This
etiological point is distinct from the epistemological claim [raised, most pertinently here, by Faraci
(2015)], that moral knowledge by perception must rest on non-perceptual moral knowledge, so
perceptualism cannot explain how we have moral knowledge at all.
6 This may not be the happiest way of drawing the distinction between perceptualism and inferentialism.
Some philosophers argue that you can gain knowledge via inferences from premises that are false and
hence unknown. See Warfield (2005) and Fitelson (2010).
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caused by a sub-conscious inference from complex premises, you do not know that
these premises are true, or at least, you do not know these premises as well as you
know the conclusion. That is, we can have a perceptualist epistemology of
perception while accepting an inferentialist account of the nature of perception. So,
we can preserve a meaningful disagreement between perceptualist and inferentialist
epistemologies about morality or modality.
This helps us clarify what perceptualism is and is not a view about. It is first and
foremost a view about epistemology: about justification, knowledge, and so on. And
it is not a contentious view about the nature of perception or perceptual contents. If
this is right, what could or should settle the disagreement between perceptualists and
inferentialists?
3 The inferentialist
McGrath’s main argument for perceptualism is presented as follows (22):
(P1) You know that the adult acted wrongly.
(P2) If you know that the adult acted wrongly, then you know this either on the
basis of perception or on the basis of inference.
(P3) You do not know that the adult acted wrongly on the basis of inference.
(C) Therefore, you know that the adult acted wrongly on the basis of
perception.7
Moral error theorists, moral skeptics, and (other) moral monsters might deny (P1),
but let’s ignore them here. We will consider (P2) in the next section. Let’s focus on
(P3) here. Why does McGrath reject inferentialism?
Following McGrath, let’s start with a toy version of inferentialism. According to
‘the Deductive Model’, you know that what the adult did was wrong because you
infer this from two known premises: (i) she /d; (ii) if she /d, she acted wrongly; so,
you infer that she acted wrongly. Crucially, on this view the first premise is known
via perception, but the second conditional moral proposition is not known via
perception.
McGrath considers three challenges to the Deductive Model. The first is
phenomenological: it doesn’t seem as though your belief is the upshot of reasoning
(4). This is not necessarily probative, however, as proponents of inferentialism
understand ‘inference’ broadly to include unconscious, immediate reasoning to
which we lack phenomenological access.8
The second is epistemological: the Deductive Model requires that you know a
sufficient condition for acting wrongly, and indeed requires that you know this
condition as well as you know that what the adult did was wrong. Of course, there
may be many sufficient conditions for acting wrongly that you can know as well as
7 I have changed McGrath’s numbering of these premises for the sake of clarity.
8 See, for instance, Va¨yrynen (2008).
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you know that what the adult did was wrong: you may know that if what the adult
did was evil then the adult acted wrongly. But that does not help the inferentialist,
because now the antecedent of this conditional—which she grants is known
perceptually—has moral content. To avoid embracing moral knowledge by
perception, the inferentialist must insist that this sufficient condition for acting
wrongly (‘‘she /d’’) has exclusively non-moral content. And, of course, it must be
knowable via perception. Dialectically, it will be hard for the inferentialist to
identify a good candidate here. Say she takes the view that we specify the first
premise of the inference in sparse vocabulary: in terms of arrangements of colors
and shapes that are the contents of perception on austere views. This looks hopeless.
What arrangements of shapes and colors form a known sufficient condition for
acting wrongly? Things don’t look hopeless if we specify the first premise of the
inference—‘she /d’—in the rich terminology (including ‘adult’, ‘child’, ‘causa-
tion’, ‘intention’, ‘pain’, ‘frustration’). But McGrath asks, ‘once we accept a view
on which the possible content of our perceptual knowledge is rich enough to include
things like the fact that someone is in pain … what principled reason is there to
exclude the possibility that some perceptual knowledge could have moral content?’
(6).
McGrath’s third and final objection to the inferentialist is a ‘hybrid’ of the first
two challenges (8). The second objection turned on propositional justification: what
justification you have for believing that the adult acted wrongly. But you can have
propositional justification that p and yet your belief that p may be unjustified. Say
that the adult in question is black and you are biased against blacks: you might have
good reasons to believe that the adult acted wrongly, but you don’t believe that she
acted wrongly on the basis of these reasons; you believe she acted wrongly because
she’s black. In this case, you would have propositional justification but lack doxastic
justification, because your belief is not based on what would justify it. With this
familiar distinction in mind, consider the Deductive Model once more: for your
belief that the adult acted wrongly to be justified, or for it to constitute knowledge,
not only must you be justified in believing the premises (i) and (ii), but ‘your
justification for believing the premises’ must play ‘the right psychological role in
your coming to believe that the adult acted wrongly’ (9). Given the considerations
about the phenomenology and epistemology described above, it is implausible that
this condition will be met. That’s why this third objection is a ‘hybrid’.
To see why it will be hard for proponents of the Deductive Model to explain how
we are doxastically justified in believing that what the adult did was wrong, consider
what they might say about our justification for believing premise (ii) of the inference
sketched above. They might say that as ‘you are a competent user of the concept
WRONG, you could at least in principle work out the relevant sufficient condition that
is satisfied by the adult’; but unless your belief that what the adult did is wrong is
based on the justification afforded by your conceptual competence, which seems
unlikely (9), this will secure propositional but not doxastic justification.
This final objection strikes me as the most powerful blow to inferentialism. But it
is also a fairly subtle objection. It might help to compare this point to an argument
suggested by intuitionists against rivals to their view. The content of this argument
might vary, but its structure is roughly this:
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P1: S believes that p because it seems to S that p [empirical claim].
P2: If P1 is true, then S’s belief is justified only if the fact that it seems to S
that p provides justification for S to believe that p.
C: S’s belief is justified only if the fact that it seems to S that p provides
justification for S to believe that p.
To be clear, this is argument is often only suggested by intuitionists.9 And for it to
be complete we would want to substitute values for the variables in P1, which is
meant to be an empirical claim that our beliefs about such-and-such (e.g., that the
adult acted wrongly) are based on intuitions. If we want to explain how such beliefs
can constitute knowledge, the upshot of this would be that we have to grant that
intuitionism is true: the fact that it seems to you that p is a reason to believe that
p. The point McGrath is pressing is similar. If your belief that the adult did
something wrong is based on your perceptions in the relevant sense, then it can
constitute knowledge only if there is perceptual moral knowledge.
We’ve now considered McGrath’s three objections to inferentialism, in order
from least to most damning. Do they rule out this rival view?
I don’t think so. I will first argue that McGrath’s three objections to the
Deductive Model overgeneralize, and then I will argue that these objections leave
sophisticated versions of inferentialism unscathed. If either of these responses
succeed, inferentialism remains defensible.
Why think that these objections to the Deductive Model overgeneralize? Let’s
consider a case where a simple inferentialist view seems plausible. Consider your
knowledge that this sentence are ungrammatical. Let’s grant that you know this on
the basis of either perception or inference. It is hard to see how you could know that
sentences are ungrammatical via perception, in any interesting sense, without taking
on very strong commitments about linguistics.10 So it seems more plausible that you
know the sentence is ungrammatical inferentially. This means you have to know,
and base your belief on, a sufficient condition for a sentence being ungrammatical.
But you would probably struggle to specify it accurately.
If you doubt this final claim, consider how hard it is to specify sufficient
conditions for subject-verb agreement for sentences involving either conjunctive
and disjunctive subjects or subjects that are syntactically plural and semantically
singular (e.g., ‘You are my best friend’). Or just switch to a better example where
we know whether particular sentences are grammatical without being able to state
the relevant grammatical rule.
Suppose the above is the right thing to say about our knowledge of particular
grammatical truths: such knowledge is gained inferentially from applications of
9 In particular, by Huemer (2001 pp. 55–57, 2007, pp. 39–41). Huemer is explicitly concerned with the
more narrow and defensive argument that objections to intuitionism that depend on intuitions are self-
defeating. But he suggests a more general and interesting point in that context when he writes, for
instance, that ‘I have argued that if [intuitionism] is false, we have no justified beliefs even if we have
available justification for various propositions’, p. 45. This is the upshot of the schematic argument above.
10 Why is that? Briefly, because our grammatical knowledge about, say, subject/verb agreement, seems
to depend entirely on our a posteriori knowledge of contingent rules.
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complex rules of grammar that we cannot specify. If this is right, or even plausible,
then there should be a good story about how we can know and base beliefs upon
complex rules of grammar that we cannot specify. And whatever that story is, we
should be able to wield it out to defend the view that we can gain knowledge of
particular moral facts by deductively applying complex moral rules that we cannot
specify. That is, we should be able to defend even the toy Deductive Model.
Note that the foregoing appeal to companions in guilt need not involve any
contentious commitments about grammatical knowledge. We need not say that our
knowledge of the rules of English grammar is innate, for instance. We just need to
be able tell a good story about how we can know, apply, and base other beliefs upon,
complex rules that we cannot state.
Of course, this appeal to companions in guilt only goes so far. For one, the
inferentialist account of grammatical knowledge would need to be motivated. In
part, more would need to be said about a widely accepted rival to both inferentialism
and perceptualism in this context: that we know particular facts about grammat-
icality on the basis of linguistic intuitions about (un)acceptability. If that’s a viable
option, we should not accept the counterpart to McGrath’s (P2): If you know that
‘This sentence are ungrammatical’, you know this either on the basis of perception
or on the basis of inference. As we’ll see in the next section, the dialectical situation
here is very similar with respect to moral perception.
But before we get to moral intuitionism, let’s consider another way of defending
inferentialist explanations of how you know that what the adult did was wrong. Say
that the Deductive Model fails. That would not be surprising, since as Gil Harman
(1984) famously argued, deductive syllogisms are a poor model of human reasoning
and inferences. So do McGrath’s objections target more sophisticated forms of
inferentialism?
Let’s consider how they might appeal to a view that plausibly matches the actual
structure of human inferences: John Horty’s ‘default reasoning’. The idea behind
Horty’s view is best conveyed with his main example:
If an agent is told only that Tweety is a bird, it would be natural for that agent
to conclude that Tweety is able to fly. Our everyday reasoning seems to be
governed by a general default according to which birds, as a rule, are able to
fly (Horty 2007, p. 3).
That this rule is a ‘general default’ means that it admits of exceptions. Tweety might
be a penguin or an emu or any other flightless bird. But it is still a good rule all the
same. Inferring that Tweety can fly from this rule plus the information that Tweety
is a bird seems to be reasonable.11
How might inferentialists apply defaults to explain moral inferences? They might
say that ‘/ing is wrong’ is a known defeasible generalization, on which your
conclusion that what the adult did is wrong is based. Given the description of the
case above, there are plenty of good candidates for what that generalization might
be: hitting children is wrong, causing others pain out of sheer frustration is wrong,
11 For more on this idea, see Horty (2007, 2012).
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and so on. None of these rules, remember, must be exception-less in order for this
model to work.
Admittedly, McGrath considers a view that sounds a lot like the above. But she
insists that the relevant generalization must be statistical: the generalization would
not be that ‘birds fly’, but that ‘most birds fly’. This raises two problems for the
inferentialist. The first, which she does not mention, is that as McGrath reconstructs
the relevant inference, we would no longer get knowledge that what the adult did
was wrong. We would get knowledge that ‘(probably) what the adult did was
wrong’ (10). The inferentialist should explain how we know more than this hedged
claim. The second and more pressing difficulty is that if the generalization is
statistical, then we would require an induction from observed instances:
[The premise that ‘most cases in which a child is struck are cases of wrongful
action’] is not a potential piece of a priori knowledge: given that at least some
strikings of children are not cases of wrongful action, it is an empirical
question whether most are. A claim such as ‘‘Most strikings of children are
cases of wrongful action’’ is a statistical generalization, and it is known, if it is
known at all, in the way that statistical generalizations are (11).
But if we do not know this statistical generalization a priori—if we only know it
based on observed instances wrongful strikings of children—this version of
inferentialism turns out to depend on there being prior perceptual moral knowledge.
In which case, the perceptualist wins.
Inferentialists should avoid this problem by denying that the relevant general-
izations must be statistical. The relevant type of generic generalization, they should
say, is characteristic rather than majority: it is in the nature of birds to fly, and in the
nature of strikings of children to be wrong.12 This does not entail that all birds fly or
that all strikings of children are wrong. Characteristic property generics admit of
exceptions. Nor does it entail that the generalization can be known a priori. We
might only be able to know that birds fly on the basis of observation. But plausibly,
we can know some such moral generic generalizations on the basis of a priori
reasoning. After all, a great deal of moral philosophy involves arguments for
conclusions like ‘Eating meat is wrong’ or ‘Abortion is wrong’. These conclusions
are best interpreted as characteristic property generics (it is, allegedly, in the nature
of eating meat or having an abortion to be wrong). And yet the relevant arguments
are not inductive inferences from observed correlations. They are a priori.
Notice that in the foregoing, I have defended inferentialism by assuming that the
first premise of the relevant inference can have rich content (e.g., ‘The adult struck
the child’) and yet be known via perception alone. This means that the versions of
inferentialism that I have defended are still impaled on the second horn of the
dilemma in McGrath’s epistemological objection: if the content of our perceptual
knowledge is rich enough to include facts like that, the inferentialist still needs to
provide a principled reason to exclude there being perceptual knowledge with moral
12 See Wodak et al. (2015) and Wodak and Leslie (2017). Here ‘in the nature of’ tracks the
psychologist’s (rather than the metaphysician’s) notion of essence: see Leslie (2013).
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content. This might undermine inferentialist arguments against perceptualism. But
that does not make inferentialism itself an unattractive rival. So it does not help
McGrath execute her offensive strategy for defending her thesis.
4 The intuitionist
So much for the inferentialist. Now let’s consider a rival to perceptualism that
McGrath ignores: moral intuitionism. As I noted, once we recognize that
intuitionism is a rival hypothesis for how you know that what the adult did was
wrong, we should not accept that you know this either on the basis of perception or
on the basis of inference; at least, not without some further argument against the
intuitionist explanation.
Intuitionism and perceptualism have a great deal in common, in large part
because the intuitionist mantra has long been that whatever we say about the
epistemology of perceptual seemings, the intuitionist will say the same about
intellectual seemings (i.e., intuitions). Some intuitionists even think that there is just
one foundationalist story about the epistemology of seemings or appearances, and
that if one believes that (say) perceptual seemings confer justification on their
contents but intellectual seemings don’t, then one must identify an epistemically
relevant difference between the two.13 As I noted above, intuitionists also motivate
their views with similar considerations to McGrath’s, by appealing to the basing
relation.
This will make it much harder for the perceptualist to offer a simple objection to
the intuitionist explanation of how you know that what the adult did was wrong.
Whatever the perceptualist says about how you know this based on perceptual
seemings, the intuitionist can say something similar about how you know this on the
basis of intellectual seemings. Indeed, the explanation can be far more direct,
because plausibly we can and do have intellectual seemings with moral content. If
you see someone strike a child, that will probably seem morally wrong.
That’s a minor advantage for the intuitionist. But they also have a more
significant advantage over perceptualist explanations of ordinary moral knowledge.
Consider how much of our moral inquiry is a priori. We do not push fat men in front
of trains to see with our eyes whether it was wrong. Instead, we run thought
experiments. We consider imagined cases.14
To dramatize this point, let’s return to McGrath’s main example. She uses the
example in the following way: Suppose you witness the adult strike the child in a
parking lot; in that scenario, you would know that this act was wrong. Instead, let’s
now imagine a frustrated adult striking a child in a parking lot. Plausibly, you can
actually know right now that what the imagined adult did was wrong. Notice two
things about this claim. First, it concerns the actual you reading this paper, not the
13 See, e.g., Huemer (2007, p. 32).
14 This is leaving aside Kagan (2001)’s concern that the cases we imagine may be case types rather than
tokens. See also McGrath (2018)’s response to Kagan.
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supposed you in the parking lot. Second, it concerns you actually knowing that a
hypothetical act is wrong; the wrongness is not actually instantiated.
Now we can ask: what explains how the actual you can know that what the
imagined adult did was wrong? The intuitionist can explain this very easily: our
intuitions can concern actual and hypothetical cases. It seems to the actual you that
what the adult did was wrong, and that’s the starting point for explaining how you
can know that what the adult did wrong.
What can the perceptualist say in answer to this question? One option is to say
that moral perception does not explain how you can actually know that what the
imagined adult did was wrong. McGrath only claims that there is some perceptual
moral knowledge; she does not embrace an outlandish universally quantified claim:
that all moral knowledge is perceptual.
If McGrath takes this first option, she will be in good company. In defending
modal knowledge by perception, Strohminger (2015) writes:
There are many instances of knowledge of nonactual possibilities that cannot
be based on sense perception. Thought experiments seem to be capable of
yielding modal knowledge. However they do so, it is clear that the knowledge
is not perceptual (p. 369).
If this is the right view about modal knowledge in thought experiments, and we
want a general view about perceptual modal and moral knowledge, then we are
under a great deal of pressure to take this first option.
But the first option comes with some costs. We’re considering rival explanatory
hypotheses. Hypotheses that explain more of the data are, ceteris paribus,
superior. If the intuitionist’s resources can explain more than the perceptualist’s—
if they explain our moral knowledge of actual and imagined particular cases—
intuitionism has at least one theoretical advantage. Moreover, the perceptualist
will have to grant that there is some good explanation for how we know that what
the imagined adult did was wrong. What would that explanation be? If it is
inferential, it would seem that we could run all of McGrath’s objections to
inferentialism once more and they will be just as good. Ditto for any objections to
intuitionist explanations of our moral knowledge in actual particular cases. That
makes it hard to see how the perceptualist can allege that intuitionism comes with
serious theoretical disadvantages. And finally, there is at least something to be
said for the thought that our moral knowledge of actual and imagined cases seem
similar enough that we should explain both the same way. Granted that appeals to
phenomenology are not always probative in epistemology, as we saw above, but
the perceptualist at least should bear some burden in explaining why the
explanation of moral knowledge in actual cases and imagined cases is utterly
different when the two seem so very similar.
So much for the first option. Now let’s consider the second: the perceptualist
could say that her view also explains how you can actually know that what the
imagined adult did was wrong. This is no easy task. Since wrongness is not
instantiated, there is no wrongness for the actual you to perceive in this imagined
scenario. Perceptualists could deny this. But in explaining how moral perception
works ‘offline’ in relation to imagined cases, they will have to take on many further
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commitments.15 Even if this explanation works, the intuitionist will still have a
theoretical advantage. Intuitionism explains more with less. And ceteris paribus, we
should prefer hypotheses that manage to explain more with less.
Perhaps, at this point, the perceptualist will push back that all things are not
equal. Perhaps her theory becomes more complex once it expands to allow for moral
knowledge in actual and imagined particular cases, but the intuitionist explanation is
worse along some other dimension. The perceptualist might press, as McGrath
did,16 that intuitionism is worse as it leads to skepticism in cases involving
interpersonal disagreement.
Kieran Setiya recently made this objection to intuitionism. First, he says, we
should be agnostic in cases involving interpersonal perceptual disagreement, such as
in the following example from Adam Elga:
You and a friend are to judge the same contest, a race between Horse A and
Horse B. Initially, you think that your friend is as good as you at judging such
races. In other words, you think that in case of disagreement about the race,
the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. The race is run, and the two
of you form independent judgments. As it happens, you become confident that
Horse A won, and your friend becomes equally confident that Horse B won
(Setiya 2012, pp. 28-29, citing Elga).
Second, he continues, if the epistemology of intellectual seemings mirrors the
epistemology of perceptual seemings, then we should also be agnostic in cases
involving interpersonal moral disagreements like the following:
Suppose … that you belong to a homogeneous community whose ethical
beliefs are true and who are non-ethically well-informed. Let us add that your
beliefs are proportioned to your intuitions, finding the perfect balance of
simplicity, power, and explanatory depth, weighed against fidelity to how
things seem. For the first time, you meet a stranger. He agrees with you outside
of ethics, but when it comes to practical reason, his intuitions are shocking.
Fill in the details as you like. Perhaps it seems to him that we should act on our
final desires, whatever they are, that we should be utterly selfish, that we
should maximize aggregate happiness no matter who is trampled on the way.
Despite this, his ethical beliefs are as well-proportioned to his intuitions as
your beliefs are to yours. It turns out that he, too, belongs to a homogenous
community, exactly as numerous as your own. What should you now believe?
If intuitions play the role of perceptual appearances and provide us with
evidence in a similar way, the horse race argument applies. Before you meet
the stranger, you have justified beliefs. But now you know how things seem to
him, your confidence should fade. Apart from the intuitions in dispute, you
have no basis for your ethical beliefs, and no more evidence of your reliability
than his. You have no independent reason to discount the stranger’s intuitions.
This being so, you should give how things seem to him as much evidential
15 See, e.g., Johnston (2004) and Lord (forthcoming).
16 This was McGrath’s central response in personal correspondence.
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weight as how they seem to you. You should thus become agnostic about the
ethical questions on which you disagree (ibid., p. 30).
Setiya says that agnosticism ‘is not the right response’—‘we should not defer to
moral monsters but condemn them, no matter how coherent or numerous they
are’—so he concludes that intuitionism is false.17
Does this objection succeed? And if so, does it help the perceptualist? Let’s take
these questions in reverse order, as the second is easier to answer. No, it can’t help
the perceptualist. The objection starts with a claim about the epistemology of
perception in general: in cases of disagreement involving perceptual seemings,
become agnostic. If that’s true for perception in general, it’s true for moral
perception. And if it’s not true for moral perception, the intuitionist will say it’s not
true of moral intuition. The intuitionist’s mantra, recall, is that whatever we say
about the epistemology of perceptual seemings, the intuitionist will say the same
about intellectual seemings. If perceptual seemings that yield moral knowledge
allow us to stand our ground in the face of disagreement, why would intellectual
seemings that yield moral knowledge be different?
We just saw that if the objection works at all, it works equally well against the
perceptualist; intuitionism has no distinctive theoretical vice here. Thankfully for
both theories, the objection does not work at all. The explanation for why turns on a
key phrase from Setiya above: ‘You have no independent reason to discount the
stranger’s intuitions’, so ‘you should give how things seem to him as much
evidential weight as how they seem to you’. This claim should be rejected, as it gets
the wrong results about the epistemology of perception in general.18 As Katia
Vavova has argued, we need to distinguish between not having a reason for being
confident that we’re more reliable and having a reason for being confident that
we’re not more reliable.19 It matters a great deal where we put the ‘not’. If we
should be agnostic when we have no reason for being confident that we’re more
reliable, then we get the result that we should be agnostic when we disagree with
someone about everything (or at least, we get this result so long as we accept a
plausible commitment called Independence).20 But we don’t get this result if we set
the bar for agnosticism higher by requiring that we have a reason to think that we’re
not more reliable. In the horse race case, this higher bar is met—reasonably, ‘you
think that in case of disagreement…, the two of you are equally likely to be
mistaken’. In Setiya’s example, this higher bar is not met: ‘you have no independent
reason to discount the stranger’s intuitions’, but you do not have an independent
reason to think that you and the stranger are equally reliable!
17 Id. The dialectic in Setiya’s chapter is actually more complex: he concludes that intuitionism either
gets the wrong results about disagreement or is committed to an implausible form of egoism; either way,
he concludes, it turns out to be false.
18 See Christensen (2011, especially at p. 15).
19 Vavova (2014, especially at pp. 316–318). Cf. Setiya (2012, p. 20, n. 14).
20 Independence is formulated by Vavova (2014, p. 309) as follows: ‘In evaluating the epistemic
credentials of another’s expressed belief that p, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own
belief about p, I shouldn’t rely on my initial belief that [not] p, nor on the reasoning behind that belief’.
(The negation in the square brackets has been added to amend a typographical error in the text.)
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So, it looks like the objection that intuitionism leads to skepticism relies on a
false premise about the epistemology of perceptual disagreement, and even if it
doesn’t the objection would also target perceptualism. This suggests that if
perceptualists want to motivate their view by ruling out rival hypotheses, they need
to say much more to rule out intuitionism.
5 The reductive epistemologist
Finally, we come to the reductive epistemologist. This view was advanced a few
years ago by Setiya as a response to the skeptical challenge allegedly posed by
disagreement. Reductive Epistemology has received little critical attention;
McGrath, however, offers an interesting objection to the view, with the aim of
showing that it is not a plausible rival to perceptualism.
Let’s start by getting the view into focus. Setiya assumes the following:
Supervenience: If x falls under ethical concept E it does so in virtue of falling
under non-ethical concepts, N, such that necessarily, what falls
under N falls under E (Setiya 2012, p. 10)
To illustrate this with a toy example: if x is bad, it is bad in virtue of being painful,
such that necessarily if something is painful then it is also bad.
This looks a lot like traditional formulations of the supervenience of the ethical
on the non-ethical, but with two twists. One is that this claim is formulated in terms
of objects falling under concepts; that’s intended to make the thesis compatible with
certain naturalist theories. The other is that Supervenience picks out two relations
that hold between, in the illustrative example above, painfulness and badness:
painfulness necessitates badness, and badness obtains in virtue of painfulness. In
other words, Supervenience captures both supervenience and grounding.21
Assume, for the moment, that Supervenience obtains for some x, N and E.
Where that assumption is true, Setiya’s epistemological view is as follows:
Reductive Epistemology: What justifies S in believing that x falls under E just is
what justifies S in believing that x falls under N.22
So, in relation to our toy example, what justifies you in believing that something is
bad just is what justifies you in believing that its painful. This view reduces moral
evidence to non-moral evidence, hence the label.
An important feature of this view is that it is non-inferential. It does not require
ordinary agents to believe, or have any reason to believe, the facts about
supervenience and grounding. Say that if x is bad, it is bad in virtue of being painful,
such that necessarily if something is painful then it is also bad. Call this a normative
law. In the parking lot case, you don’t need to know that this normative law is true,
21 Depending on how these claims are construed, the claim about supervenience could be redundant: it is
widely thought that if the fact that p is grounded in the fact that q, then q entails p. [See especially ‘the
entailment principle’ in Rosen (2010, p. 118.)].
22 Setiya (2012, p. 49).
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or anything of the like. Your evidence that striking the child is painful is sufficient
for you to have justification for believing that striking the child is bad. Mutatis
mutandis for any other ethical concept (e.g., WRONGNESS), and any more complex
normative law about that ethical concept. That’s the strategy the reductive
epistemologist will use to explain ordinary moral knowledge, and it seems well-
designed to avoid McGrath’s objections to inferentialism.
However, McGrath raises a further objection to Reductive Epistemology that
turns on transitivity. Assume that pain supervenes on microphysical facts, namely
C-Fiber firings. The supervenience relation is transitive, so it follows from this and
our earlier assumption that badness supervenes on C-Fiber firings: if the moral
supervenes on the mental, and the mental supervenes on the material, the moral
supervenes on the material. Now, McGrath presses, the Reductive Epistemologist
must say that evidence of how things are microphysically just is evidence of how
things are morally.
This commitment, McGrath thinks, would be problematic. Consider an ordinary
agent in the following extraordinary circumstances: she is a subject in an
experiment where neuroscientists show her a video of the microphysical changes in
a child’s neural system after a certain stimulus. What stimulus? A slap from a
frustrated adult in a parking lot. But our experimental subject does not know this.
Nor does she know the normative law about badness and pain. And nor does she
know the corresponding mental law about pain and C-Fibers. All she knows from
the scientists’ testimony and the video is that C-Fibers were firing. Question: does
the ordinary agent thereby have evidence of badness?
McGrath believes, quite rightly, that the answer is ‘No’. She also believes that the
Reductive Epistemologist must say ‘Yes’. The Reductive Epistemologist could try
to say that this result is not so bad, I but think the Reductive Epistemologist need not
even answer ‘Yes’ in the first place.
Why is that? It’s because Supervenience is not just supervenience. It’s
supervenience plus grounding. The former is undeniably transitive (if there’s no A
difference without a B difference, and no B difference without a C difference,
there’s no A difference without a C difference). But whether the latter relation is
transitive is controversial. If the moral is grounded in the mental, and the mental is
grounded in the material, does it follow that the moral is grounded in the material?
Maybe. But maybe not. If grounding is one relation, it is a type of explanatory
relation, and not all explanatory relations are obviously transitive. Consider
causation: that causation is a non-transitive explanatory relation is at least tenable.
Moreover, it is not even clear that grounding is just one relation. Many treat it as a
term for a family of different asymmetric and irreflexive necessitation relations
(some of which are arguably non-transitive).23 If p grounds1 q and q grounds2 r,
must p groundsn r? Not obviously. Moreover, many in metaethics have argued that
non-naturalists should think that there is a relation of normative grounding that is
distinct from the relation of metaphysical grounding, such that if the material
metaphysically grounds the mental and the mental normatively grounds the moral it
23 See, among others, Wilson (2014) and Bennett (2017).
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does not follow that the material grounds the moral in any interesting way.24 So,
there are options for the Reductive Epistemologist to avoid being saddled with the
committed to the transitivity of Supervenience, and thereby avoid committing to
the claim (in our toy example above) that how things are materially just is evidence
of how things are morally.
It is worth pausing here to note that the lattermost option (positing a distinct species
of normative grounding) is closely associated with non-naturalism about normativity.
This may not be in keeping with Setiya’s own metaethical sympathies. But it should be
an option for Reductive Epistemologists more generally. Setiya motivates his
formulation of Supervenience in terms of concepts rather than properties to make
the view friendly to naturalists who hold that the property of badness is identical to a
natural property (e.g., painfulness). But as Gideon Rosen (2017) has argued at length,
claiming that the normative is metaphysically grounded in the non-normative is
unfriendly to non-naturalism. This makes Supervenience less ecumenical than it was
perhaps intended to be. So the Reductive Epistemologist should be open to a plurality of
positions on how we understand ‘in virtue of’ talk in these contexts, to ensure that
Reductive Epistemology is not tethered to a reductive metaphysics.
Could the Reductive Epistemologist just modify their view by dropping the
commitment to grounding?Notwithout generating a litany of counterexamples. These
will include the counterexample above, which involves transitivity. But it will also
include cheap supervenience theses. If there can be noAdifference, then trivially there
can be no A difference without a B difference. So if we cannot vary the necessary
normative facts, then they trivially supervene on anything and everything. This means
that evidence of literally anything and everything will be evidence of all of the
necessary normative truths, for a modified Reductive Epistemology.
So, if the Reductive Epistemologists is stuck with a commitment to some sort of
grounding relation holding between the normative and the non-normative, but wants
their view to be ecumenical, then they should be open to there being a plurality of
grounding relations. That makes the view friendly to a least one kind of metaethical
non-naturalism. And it allows Reductive Epistemologists to avoid McGrath’s
counterexample.
Interestingly, this isn’t the route Setiya prefers to take in response to such
concerns. Instead, he emphasizes that Reductive Epistemology only explains
propositional justification, rather than doxastic justification. In the case where
scientists give you evidence of C-Fiber firings, you are only propositionally justified
in believing that what’s happening is bad. To be doxastically justified, Setiya adds,
you need (at least) to exercise a reliable disposition to form beliefs about badness on
the basis of C-Fiber firings.25
This makes the Reductive Epistemologist’s explanation for why the ordinary
agent knows that the adult’s act was wrong more complex. Knowledge requires
doxastic justification. So the agent not only needs evidence that the adult’s act
24 Cf. Bader (2017) and Berker (2018).
25 See Setiya (2012, pp. 64–5); see also McGrath (17–18).
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causes pain, or whatever; she also needs to be exercising a reliable disposition to
form beliefs about wrongness.
McGrath thinks that this appeal to ‘the machinery of epistemically reliable
dispositions does provide a satisfying answer’ to the question of why if you only had
evidence that some act makes C-Fibers fire, your belief that the act is bad would not
be justified; but she contends that Setiya still has not explained why it would be
uniquely rational in this case for you to suspend judgment about that matter (19). I
agree with the latter point, but I am not sure about the former. Is the answer
satisfying? What if you just started believing that acts are wrong whenever you
believed that they make C-Fibers fire, without having any reason whatsoever to
believe the relevant normative laws or mental laws that link C-Fibers to badness?
This would give you a reliable belief-forming disposition. Is it enough to give you
doxastic justification? I think the answer is ‘No’. And Setiya agrees: his view
captures this by pointing out that it is an accident that your belief-forming
disposition is reliable here. Setiya has much to say about accidentality and how it
relates to knowledge and justification.26 I will not take issue with views on it, but
rather suggest that accidentality is not the most profitable place to look to explain
why your belief is unjustified. You are not disposed to form such beliefs because
they are true; the reason why is that (a) you have no knowledge of the supervenience
of the moral on the mental and of the mental on the physical, and (b) the latter
relation (between pain and C-Fibers firing) is a posteriori and outside your ken.
This suggests a diagnosis for the, or at least a, problem for Reductive
Epistemology. Setiya rightly wants to avoid an overly intellectualized pictures like
the Deductive Model: ‘it is not a condition of evidentially justified belief that one
believe a conditional whose antecedent is one’s evidence and whose consequent the
content of one’s belief’.27 So he embraces a ‘natural’ alternative: that doxastic
justification requires one to ‘manifest a disposition’ that tracks propositional
justification, and knowledge requires one to ‘manifest a disposition’ that tracks truth
(where the reliability of these dispositions is ‘no accident’). This alternative may
look ‘natural’ when we restrict our focus to cases in which the truth of the relevant
conditionals is knowable a priori (which Setiya does, in focusing on normative
laws). But things are different when we turn to conditionals that are only knowable a
posteriori: in many such cases not only will we not believe the relevant conditionals,
but we will have no reason to believe that they are true: in that sense, they’re outside
our ken. This does not mean that C-Fibers firing cannot be evidence of badness. But
it does suggest that more will be required for you to possess this evidence, such that
beliefs (reliably) formed on this basis can be justified.28
26 Setiya (2012, pp. 65 ff). The relevant principle governing accidental reliability, K, explicitly applies to
knowledge (p. 96), but extends to doxastic justification since doxastic justification depends on the
capacity for knowledge (ch. 4). I am grateful to Kieran Setiya for clarifying and confirming these details
in personal correspondence.
27 Ibid., p. 63.
28 What more is required? This turns on the long-standing debates about what it takes to have a reason:
see Schroeder (2008), Whiting (2014), Sylvan (2015) and Wodak (2017).
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The dialectic here, admittedly, has become quite messy, in large part because
Reductive Epistemology on its own does not provide clear enough verdicts about
cases: to do so, it must be coupled with orthogonal theses about metaphysics (is
grounding transitive?) and epistemology (what additional feature is required for
doxastic justification on this view?). It is worth registering, however, that it would
be nice to be able to test Reductive Epistemology against simpler, more mundane
cases. If Reductive Epistemology goes awry, it seems to go awry in artificial cases
involving neuroscientists and given esoteric claims about transitivity. It does not
seem to stumble in explaining ordinary moral knowledge. So it is not an unattractive
rival to perceptualism with respect to our original explanandum: how do you know
that what the adult did was wrong?
6 Conclusion
The two most important features of McGrath’s approach to defending perceptualism
are (a) her focus on the importance of explaining ordinary moral knowledge, and
(b) her argumentative strategy of eliminating rival explanations to moral perception.
I am very sympathetic to the focus on ordinary moral knowledge, but I am skeptical
that we are yet in a position to settle on moral perception by ruling out its rivals.
This is partly because with some rivals to moral perception (like moral inference
and the reduction of moral evidence to non-moral evidence) come in far more
varieties than we might have thought, and partly because there are other alternative
explanans, like moral intuition, that provide formidable rivals.
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